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Abstract— The need for technology to assist in medical monitoring 
applications is becoming more necessary in society as the number 
of patients in hospital and clinics continues to grow. The demand 
on staff to monitor every individual consistently becomes 
necessary. Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are now being used to 
facilitate this on-demand monitoring both at the patients home 
and in the hospital/clinic environment. This paper looks at the 
basic parameters necessary for a medical based WSN with 
particular focus on communication platforms and their security. 
These parameters will be compared and contrasted, and the main 
components necessary to form an ideal medical WSN will be 
highlighted. 
Keywords-sensors; WSN architecture; WSN security; wireless 
platform; medical WSN; 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A wireless sensor network (WSN) system is able to perform 
activities that help reduce the workload for the duty staff and 
provide more freedom for patients. Research into the use of 
WSNs for healthcare applications is ongoing in the area of 
technologies, methods and mechanisms. For example, normal 
monitoring of vitals, capsule endoscopy, monitoring of body 
motion for Parkinson’s diseases, early warning systems 
predicting attacks e.g., EEG reporting symptoms of Epilepsy, 
ECG for measuring heart functions and pulse oxi-meter for 
blood saturation levels. Moreover, project CodeBlue includes 
systems supporting emergencies, [1], and everyday monitoring 
systems include HealthOS by HiNRG [2]. Others like UbiMon, 
monitor the patients in their natural environment as it helps 
analyse their physiology more accurately [3]. Tyndall research 
centre focuses on environment, fitness and health applications .  
This paper is structured as follows. In section (ii) the general 
layout/architectural structure of Medical Wireless Sensor 
Networks (MWSN) is discussed and the necessary equipment 
is outlined. In section (iii) the communication 
protocols/standards necessary for the effective operation of 
MWSN are outlined and compared. The final section, (iv), 
discusses issues that apply to all MWSN’s regardless of 
protocol used or topology employed, such as; energy 
management, routing protocols, security of data, issues and 
challenges. Finally, the conclusion endeavours to inform the 
reader of the best compromise between protocol selection, 
network topology and necessary security requirements. 
II. ARCHITECTURE 
This section provides a brief description of the system layout 
in the home and hospital environment settings. WSN 
architecture makes use of some layers of the OSI model. Three 
cross layers assist them: task management, mobility 
management and power management that are responsible for 
network management. They also improve the overall power 
efficiency by making the sensor nodes work in co-ordination 
[4].  
Figure 1. Home/hospital environment WSN system 
 
Figure 2. Work environment WSN system 
 
Some of the key issues the architecture must address are: 1) 
concurrency, as there are several parallel operations like data 
encoding and channel monitoring. 2) Flexibility, as the system 
may be applied to different applications in the medical field or 
otherwise. 3) Synchronization, as it provides control of radio 
transmission timing. Finally, 4) RF and decoupling of 
processing speed that helps improve energy performance [5]. 
 
 
  
 TABLE I.  COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS 
The sensors comprise of wearable body sensors required to 
monitor the vitals of the individual thereby accumulating data 
into the gateway or access point residing on the person’s body. 
These access points and repeaters relay the data to the base-
station which in-turn is responsible for sending it to the main 
server in the hospital or to a doctor’s PDA/cell-phone/desktop. 
Fig. 1 illustrates a common in-house/hospital set-up. Here the 
base station is usually stationary. Fig. 2 illustrates a more mobile 
set-up using smartphones, which are flexible in-terms of 
mobility and energy consumption. 
III. PROTOCOLS AND STANDARDS 
There are several existing communication protocols and 
standards, e.g., IEEE 802.3, 802.11, 802.15 and 802.16. This 
section outlines 802.15.4 and 802.15.6 standards in conjunction 
with ZigBee, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi protocols. The features 
outlined suit the requirements of MWSNs. 
A. IEEE 802.15.4 
This standard defines physical (PHY) and MAC layers for 
Low rate Wireless Personal area Networks (LR-WPANs). Its 
advantages are low power consumption, dynamic device 
addressing and low latency device support. Reduction in duty 
cycle achieves low power consumption with the help of super-
frame structures. These structures allow the sensor nodes to 
sleep during their period of inactivity [6]. 
The standard supports three schemes namely 2.4 GHz, 915 
MHz and 868 MHz. Considering the 2.4 GHz scheme, some 
versions of 802.11 WLANs, Bluetooth and microwave ovens 
might cause interference due to the common frequency band 
ISM (2.4 GHz). According to an experiment conducted by [7], 
the microwave oven causes a relatively higher interference with 
an approximate packet error rate of 4% compared to 3% in Wi-
Fi and 2% with Bluetooth or absent interfering source. Moreover 
this interference is increased when the distance between the 
source-receiver is small while vice-versa for the same distance 
between transmitter and receiver. Finally, the channel selection 
and angle between source-receiver affects the system as well. 
This implies that the 2.4 GHz scheme might not be apt for 
communications in environments involving frequent use of this 
band for other purposes. While the 868 MHz scheme may not be 
of use in emergencies, due to its low data rate. 
B. IEEE 802.15.6 
Reference [8] defines a new standard for the specification of 
wearable WSNs. It incorporates a compulsory safety procedure 
and a new PHY layer i.e., Human Body Communications 
(HBC). The standard supports three operational PHYs. The main 
responsibilities of these layers are 1) radio transceiver 
activation/deactivation, 2) Clear channel assessment and 3) data 
transmission and receiving. Moreover, it defines a new MAC 
layer in which resource allocation is handled using CSMA/CA 
or slotted Aloha access procedure. This standard is a step 
forward in wearable wireless sensor networks as it is designed 
specifically for use with a wide range of data rates, less energy 
consumption, low range, ample number of nodes (256) per body 
area network and different node priorities according to the 
application requirements.  
The standard supports three security schemes 1) unsecured 
communications level wherein there is no form of security i.e. 
authentication or encryption. 2) Authentication only, is capable 
of proving the authenticity of the data source and 3) 
authentication and encryption provides confidentiality of data in 
addition to its authentication [9]. Hence, it provides flexibility in 
security features as encryption might not be required in certain 
cases e.g. when two parties exchange public information (say 
public keys). 
In [10] the performance of 802.15.6 in comparison to 
802.15.4 is evaluated. This reveals that the former has a lower 
packet loss ratio (PLR) when the payloads are long and vice-
versa when payloads are short. However, 802.15.6 incurs more 
delays compared to 802.15.4, but with added security features 
and options. Therefore, it is inferred that 802.15.6 may be apt for 
hospital environment, where more data is to be transmitted, 
while 802.15.4 is better for personal use by individual patients 
at home. 
C. Communication Protocols 
The IEEE 802.15 standard defines the necessary 
requirements, details and specifications for the communication 
protocols. Following are the important platforms for WSN 
implementation: 
1) ZigBee: Based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, the 
ZigBee protocol defines the upper layers of the protocol stack 
and is optimised for systems demanding low energy 
Metric/Platform ZIGBEE Bluetooth Low energy (BLE) Wi-Fi 
Range 10-100 m >60m (10m for Classic BT) Depends on specification 
Power Low Very Low  (High for classic BT and medium for 
others) 
High (variable for Wi-Fi Direct) 
Entries  254  (>64000 per network) 2 Billion (Classic: 7) Depends on number of IP addresses 
Latency Low 3 ms (compared to 100ms in classic BT) Variable 
Self-healing Yes - Yes 
Topologies Mesh, Star and Cluster-tree Star Star, Point-to-Point 
Data transmission 
rate 
Up to 250Kbps 1Mbps (BT v4.0: 25Mbps) 11Mbps & 54Mbps (250 Mbps: Wi-Fi Direct) 
Bandwidth 2.4GHz, 915MHz & 868 
MHz 
2.4 GHz only (BT + HS: 6-9 GHz) 2.4, 3.6 & 5 GHz 
Transmission 
technique 
DSSS Adaptive FHSS (Classic BT: FHSS) DSSS, CCK & OFDM 
 
TABLE II. ROUTING PROTOCOLS ENERGY MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
 
 
consumption with low power and resulting low data rate. This 
is supported by an experiment conducted, with help of sensing, 
aggregation and sink tasks, using the Wireless sensor network 
simulator, [15]. Due to the low data rate it is difficult to 
implement in hospitals or clinics (multiple patients)  but is ideal 
for personal use (single patient). A drawback of this technology 
is low QoS and message throughput.  
2)  Bluetooth Low energy (BLE): It consists of sleep periods 
unlike the classic bluetooth, which drops the duty cycle from 
1.0% to 0.1%, [16]. A greater modulation index, compared to 
the radios in previous versions helps to improve the coverage 
area. Reference [17] proposed and implemented a prototype 
ECG monitoring system, which uses BLE. The results point to 
low power consumption, long-term monitoring and portability. 
However interference with other devices might be an issue as 
the technology operates in the 2.4GHz ISM band. 
Considering the metrics defined in Table I it can be deduced  
that BLE and ZigBee are apt for communication between 
thewearable sensor nodes and the AP. This is because of their 
 
 
 
nominal data rates, low latency and low energy consumption. 
Moreover, adaptive frequency hop spread spectrum allows BLE 
to co-exist with Wi-Fi; where the latter can be used for 
communication between the base station and the Hospital main 
server. 
IV. CRITICAL TOPICS 
A. Energy Management 
Energy management is an important aspect due to the 
resource constraints on WSNs. Resource constrained is 
addressed using the different hardware units [18], layers of the 
OSI stack, routing protocols, batteries and radio. Here data 
transmission is one of the most energy and power consuming 
aspect. Therefore, the communication between the BS and other 
components must be efficient. However, due to advancement in 
portable technologies it is possible to have a powerful BS while 
still keeping the mobility aspect of the system. Table II is an 
example of the techniques used for improving energy utilisation 
in routing protocols. Table III describes techniques used for 
energy management. 
 TABLE  III. ENERGY MANAGEMENT 
 
Routing protocols Description 
Directed diffusion Based on a publish/subscribe model; it uses caching & data processing to 
conserve energy [11] 
SPIN (S) If node has enough energy then protocol uses 3-way handshake security 
mechanism for transmission. In addition, data transmission occurs only when 
party is interested thus saving energy [12]. 
LEACH (L) Use of cluster head rotations & single hop routing balances the energy 
consumption [13]. 
PEGASIS (P) Absence of dynamic cluster formation avoids energy overhead. However, 
introduces delay for remote nodes [13]. 
PEGASIS Hierarchical Reduces delay by simultaneous transmission & solves data collection problem 
by taking (energy * delay) quantity into consideration [14]. 
MECN Low-power GPS & energy efficient relay nodes help improve energy 
efficiency [13]. 
COUGAR Query processing is abstracted from the network layer using declarative 
queries implying energy saving. Data aggregation also helps save energy [11]. 
TEEN (T/A) When the sensed attribute is in the range of interest, only then the nodes can 
transmit. Thus reducing number of transmissions, and saving energy [14]. 
Categories Management Techniques Notes 
Physical layer Dynamic Voltage Scaling (DVS) Dynamic adjustment of the clock speed with supply 
voltage, in relation to the instantaneous workload [19] 
MAC layer  Collision avoidance & Reduce idle listening periods Collision calls for retransmission, idle state consumes 
power 
Network layer Reduce routing table size, use real time routing 
protocols 
Efficient clustering & data gathering techniques  
Microcontroller unit  
 
Select MCU according to the requirements of 
system 
Factors: Transition cost, modes power, time spent in each 
mode [20] 
Radio Algorithms to put radio in sleep state when not 
required & 
Dynamic Modulation Scaling 
Factors: Transmission power, modulation scheme, duty 
cycle, mode change 
Batteries Do not draw higher current than specified and 
relaxation effect 
Discharge rate 
Sensors Use optimized hardware components. 
Scalable signal processing 
Signal sampling & conversion, signal conditioning and 
ADC conversion 
TABLE  IV. SECURITY ATTACKS 
 
B. Routing protocols 
Considering monitoring in MWSNs, a routing protocol 
must incorporate energy management measures, reliable 
delivery of data and responsiveness to some extent. Possibly, 
the best compromise, in energy strained environments is 
PEGASIS (P), since reliability has higher priority than 
redundant transmissions in MWSNs. Moreover, considering the 
energy performance, the protocol outperforms LEACH (L) by 
approximately 100 to 300% for varied topologies and network 
sizes [14]. Hierarchical PEGASIS may be used as it solves 
some of the problems of PEGASIS like delay incurred in the 
single cluster connected to a sink. However, APTEEN may be 
more applicable when the system requires emergency mode in 
addition to normal monitoring. 
C. Security 
As an integral part of any system, security of WSNs is 
treated differently from traditional wired systems in several 
aspects. The platform is wireless therefore this implies that the 
channel is more vulnerable to attacks. Considering security 
mechanisms relating to traditional networks, it is not possible 
to apply them directly due to the lack of global ID and different 
network architecture [21]. Moreover, the system is also affected 
by interference, battery life, sensor quality and surrounding 
environment. Security & reliability have to be treated with 
utmost care thereby providing a good Quality of Service (QoS) 
as the system factors-in the involvement of direct human 
contact. Some of the basic security services that must be 
integrated are; 1) authentication 2) access control 3) 
confidentiality and 4) message integrity. Other security 
measures may be provided, for e.g., security at the physical 
layer that can be achieved by manipulating features from the 
frequency hopping technique, restricted time per hop and 
hopping sequence [22]. Most security services can be provided 
by the use of public key cryptography (PKC). This is more 
secure than symmetric key cryptography as it is generally based 
upon solving the discrete log problem for low powered systems. 
However, the energy-constrained environment makes PKC 
usage difficult [21]. Therefore, some of the systems use it for 
the distribution of session-keys.  
Key management is equally important. This is because it 
provides security and reliability for the associated keying  
 
procedures. An implementation of key management scheme 
with a test-bed evaluation of a complete system can be found in 
[23].  
Moving to the class of security attacks possible, WSNs may 
be targeted externally by a laptop or internally through a 
malicious node. The former is capable of compromising the 
whole network simultaneously due to its abundant resources 
while the latter may have capabilities equivalent to another 
node in the network. Table IV shows security attacks specific 
to WSNs by categorising them with respect to the layers of the 
OSI stack model [24] [25] [26] [27].  
Due to the differences between traditional networks and 
WSNs, security protocols have been devised specifically for the 
latter. Table V shows MiniSec provides high security with low 
energy consumption thus making it suitable for MWSNs. In 
addition, LiSP is resistant to many security attacks and provides 
good security features with Intrusion Detection System (IDS), 
and reliable key distribution, which has been an important issue 
for WSNs.  
D. Issues and Challenges 
The main concern regarding WSNs for medical applications 
is the privacy and security of the patient data and control flow. 
Reference [28] describes that there is a need for role-based 
access control (RBAC) which is capable of defining the 
viewing and modifying rights of different healthcare personnel. 
Moreover, sensors might capture confidential data. This has led 
to debates on whether to allow the patient to modify the data. 
However, this modification can lead to QoS degradation. QoS 
is a major challenge as the sensors might be placed in harsh 
environments thereby reducing the accuracy of the data being 
sensed. The problem is  
difficult to contain as WSNs rely on low power radios. Another 
important aspect is the movement of the patient. This brings 
about the difficulty in implementation of routing. According to 
[33] there is a need for flexible routing infrastructure, which 
accounts for the fact that the nodes must dynamically allocate 
routes on their own because pre-programmed static routes 
might cause the network to fail. This is due to the motion of 
patient or/and sensors. 
Furthermore, there is a need for a decentralized security 
mechanism [33], as the use of one entity for handling all the 
security of the network is not viable. 
Class Attacks Defence 
Physical 
layer 
Jamming   Spectrum spread, Signal strength consistency checks, SPREAD, Channel surfing, 
mode change, low duty cycle 
Tampering Physical in-access, Encryption, Camouflage, Encryption (some cases) 
Sybil  
(affects resource allocation & Distributed storage) 
Radio resource testing, random key pre-distribution, white-listing, position 
verification & code verification 
Data Link  Exhaustion, unfairness & collision Error correcting code, rate limitation & small frames 
Network Black Hole attack Network monitoring, redundancy & Trust management 
Wormhole attack Keying techniques, handshaking (detection only) 
Neglect & greed Redundancy & probing 
Spoofing  Egress filtering, authentication, network monitoring, Received signal strength 
(detection only) 
Transport Flooding Rate limitation, client puzzles & network monitoring 
De-synchronisation Synchronisation cookies, authorization 
 
TABLE V. SECURITY PROTOCOLS 
 
E. Factors 
Several factors contribute to efficient working of WSNs and 
its components. Beginning with nodes, it is important to 
individually secure them in addition to having network security 
as an attacker might be able to access the sensor nodes or the 
gateways physically thus initiating several classes of attacks. 
Moreover, reporting of failed or malfunctioning nodes is 
important as it assists in the organising and healing of the 
network.  
Group key distribution techniques can help find the balance 
between security and power usage. This is due to the fact that 
individual keys for each node make the network secure but 
degrade the energy efficiency while a single shared key may 
render the network unsecure.  
Furthermore, medical environment calls for higher 
reporting times under emergency. This feature is important and 
for example, can be provided with the help of Exclusive access 
phases period division under the super-frame defined in the 
MAC layer of IEEE 802.15.6, [8]. Moreover, it can be 
supported by routing protocols like TEEN/APTEEN as they are 
designed for critical applications. 
F. Ideal System 
As shown in Fig. 3, an ideal system would comprise of 
sensor nodes capable of immense battery power and compact in 
size. Since the sensors may be used for long-term monitoring it 
is important that they have long battery life and their size must 
be small providing greater flexibility for the patient. 
A communication protocol that uses the new IEEE 802.15.6 
standard fits-in well with required system parameters i.e., 
range, frequencies and emergency mode. However, currently 
Bluetooth low energy (B) satisfies the requirements for 
personal MWSN system with very low power consumption, apt 
range and low latency. 
Considering routing, an ideal protocol would be energy 
efficient, reliable, dynamic, multi-hop, low in latency, scalable, 
cost efficient, secure and follow the QoS norms.  
Therefore, hierarchical PEGASIS fits the needs of MWSN as it 
is reliable, energy efficient and incurs small delay.  
 
 
Figure 3. An ideal Wireless sensor network system 
Finally, considering security, the reasons described in 
section IV(c) provide an insight into the construction of an 
efficient security protocol, which can be achieved by 
incorporating some features of LiSP into MiniSec. An ideal 
system must provide authentication, encryption, key renewals 
and message integrity to avoid masquerading, replay attacks, 
data theft and message alteration. Therefore, inclusion of a key 
renewal facility, design of which is out of the scope of this 
paper, can help achieve the desired properties of LiSP in 
MiniSec. Usually a combination of fast stream ciphers and a 4-
Byte MAC length provides sufficient security with ease of 
implementation [34]. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Existing communication protocols and standards were 
compared along with the description of a new standard, IEEE 
802.15.6, specifically designed for wearable WSNs. Finally, an 
overview of different aspects of WSNs has been discussed thus 
outlining a possible ideal system with parameters from existing 
systems.  
In the future, it is planned to compare different network 
management strategies and fuse them for the benefit of an 
efficient and reliable WSN system. Comparison of PKC and 
 
Protocol 
Advantages Disadvantages Details 
TinySec 
[29] 
Flexible, Low overhead, Unauthorized 
packet detection 
 
Message replay or resource consumption 
attacks not handled 
 
Skipjack in Cipher-block chaining mode(CBC). 
Integration with OS 
MiniSec 
[30] 
Low energy consumption with high 
security 
When large packets are sending by RF, 
higher energy consumption 
Skipjack in Offset codebook mode (OCB). 
Simultaneous authentication & encryption 
LiSP 
[31] 
Reliable key distribution, robust to Denial 
of service (DoS) and replay attacks 
Security intermediate, requires IDS for 
better security 
Periodic shared key renewal prevents key stream re-
use, no requirement of reliable broadcast at data link 
layer 
SNEP 
[32] 
Semantic security, weak message 
freshness & strong fairness, counter kept 
confidential  
Energy consumption due to Initialisation 
vector (IV) table 
Two party protocol between sensor node and base 
station 
µTesla 
[32] 
Efficient authenticated broadcast  Upper bound on maximum 
synchronization error must be known by 
each node  
Keep difference between time intervals as low as 
possible to avoid Message authentication code (MAC) 
key alteration 
 
symmetric key cryptography with different security mechanism 
e.g., power and time consumption required for each 
cryptographic method to arrive at an efficient protocol. 
Furthermore, future work will look at developing an energy 
efficient hybrid routing protocol capable of active switching 
between normal and emergency mode to facilitate the critical 
responsiveness requirement for emergencies in medical 
environments. 
REFERENCES 
 
[1]  Harvard, “CodeBlue: wireless sensors for medical care,” 2008. [Online]. 
Available: http://fiji.eecs.harvard.edu/CodeBlue. [Accessed 3 January 
2014]. 
[2]  Hopkins interNetworking Research Group, “HealthOS: A platform for 
pervasive health applications [HOWTOS],” [Online]. Available: 
http://hinrg.cs.jhu.edu/joomla/projects/221-healthos-a-platform-for-
pervasive-health-applications.html. [Accessed 17 January 2014]. 
[3]  S. Stankovic, “Medical applications based on wireless sensor networks,” 
Transactions on internet research, vol. IV, no. 2, pp. 19-23, 2009.  
[4]  A. A. A. Alkhatib and G. S. Baicher, “Wireless sensor network 
architecture,” in International Conference on Computer Networks and 
Communication Systems (CNCS 2012), Singapore, 2012.  
[5]  J. L. Hill, System architecture for wireless sensor networks, Berkeley: 
unpublished, 2003.  
[6]  J. A. Gutierrez, “On the use of IEEE Std. 802.15.4 to enable wireless 
sensor networks in building automation,” in Personal, Indoor and 
Mobile Radio Communications, 2004. PIMRC 2004. 15th IEEE 
International Symposium on, Barcelona, 5-8 Sept. 2004.  
[7]  W. M. Healy and M. Zhou, “Impacts of 2.4-GHz ISM band interference 
on IEEE 802.15.4 wireless sensor network,” Instrumentation and 
Measurement, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 61, no. 9, pp. 2533-2544, 
2012.  
[8]  S. Ullah, M. Mohaisen and M. A. Alnuem, “A review of IEEE 802.15.6 
MAC, PHY and security specifications,” International Journal of 
Distributed Sensor Networks, vol. 2013, March 2013.  
[9]  K. S. Kwak, S. Ullah and N. Ullah, “An overview of IEEE 802.15.6 
standard (invited paper),” in Applied Sciences in Biomedical and 
Communication Technologies (ISABEL), 3rd International Symposium 
on, Rome, 7-10 Nov. 2010.  
[10] F. Martelli, C. Buratti and R. Verodone, “On the performance of an IEEE 
802.15.6 wireless body area network,” in Sustainable Wireless 
Technologies (European Wireless), 11th European , 27-29 April 2011.  
[11] N. A. Pantazis, S. A. Nikolidakis and D. D. Verfados, “Energy-efficient 
routing protocols in wireless sensor networks: A survey,” IEEE 
COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 551-
591, 2013.  
[12] P. Krishnaveni and J. Sutha, “Analysis of routing protocols for wireless 
sensor networks,” International Journal of Emerging Technology and 
Advanced Engineering, vol. 2, no. 11, pp. 401-407, November 2012.  
[13] R. Cheour, F. Derbel, O. Kanoun and M. Abid, “Wireless sensor 
networks with power management for low energy consumption,” in 
Systems, Signals & Devices (SSD), 2013 10th International Multi-
Conference on , 18-21 March 2013.  
[14] K. Akkaya and M. Younis, “A survey of routing protocols in wireless 
sensor networks,” Ad Hoc Network (Elsevier), vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 325-349, 
May 2005.  
[15] M. Kohvakka, M. Kuorilehto, M. Hännikäinen and T. D. Hämäläinen, 
“Performance analysis of ieee 802.15.4 and zigbee for large-scale 
wireless sensor network applications,” PE-WASUN ’06: Proc. 3rd ACM 
international workshop on Performance evaluation of wireless ad hoc, 
sensor and ubiquitous networks, pp. 48-57, Oct 6, 2006.  
[16] J. Decuir, “Bluetooth 4.0: Low energy,” 2010. 
[17] B. Yu, L. Xu and Y. Li, “Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) Based Mobile 
Electrocardiogram Monitoring System,” in Proceeding of the IEEE 
International Conference on Information and Automation, Shenyang, 
2012.  
[18] M. Healy, T. Newe and E. Lewis, “Wireless Sensor Node Hardware,” in 
Measurement, Instrumentation, and Sensors Handbook, Second Edition, 
Spatial, Mechanical, Thermal, and Radiation Measurement, CRC Press 
2014, 2014, pp. 1-15. 
[19] X. Lin, Y. Kwok and H. Wang, “Energy-efficient resource management 
techniques in wireless sensor networks,” in Guide to wireless sensor 
networks, S. Misra, I. Woungang and S. C. Misra, Eds., London, 
Springer-Verlag, 2009, pp. 439-468. 
[20] V. Raghunathan, C. Schurgers, S. Park and M. Srivastava, “Energy-
aware wireless microsensor networks,” Signal processing magazine, 
IEEE, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 40-50, 2002.  
[21] L. Xing and H. Michel, “Integrated modeling for wireless sensor 
networks reliability and security,” in Reliability and Maintainability 
Symposium, 2006. RAMS '06. Annual, 23-26 Jan. 2006.  
[22] H. Tahir and S. Shah, “Wireless sensor networks - a security 
perspective,” in Multitopic Conference, 2008. INMIC 2008. IEEE 
International, 23-24 Dec. 2008.  
[23] S. Möller, T. Newe and S. Lochmann, “Prototype of a secure wireless 
patient monitoring system for the medical community,” Sensors and 
Actuators A: Physical, vol. 173, no. 1, pp. 55-65, Jan. 2012.  
[24] X. Yang, T. Bin, L. Qi, Z. Jian-yi and H. Zheng-Ming, “A novel 
framework of defense system against DoS attacks in wireless sensor 
networks,” in Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile 
Computing (WiCOM), 2011 7th International Conference on, 23-25 
Sept. 2011.  
[25] J. Newsome, E. Shi, D. Song and A. Perrig, “The Sybil attack in sensor 
networks: analysis & defenses,” in Information Processing in Sensor 
Networks, 2004. IPSN 2004. Third International Symposium on, 26-27 
April 2004.  
[26] V. B. Srinivas and S. Umar, “Spoofing attacks in wireless sensor 
networks,” International journal of Computer science Engineering and 
Technology, vol. 3, no. 6, pp. 201-210, 2013.  
[27] T. Newe, V. Cionca and D. Boyle, “Security for wireless sensor networks 
- configuration aid,” in Advances in wireless sensors and sensor 
networks, Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 2010, pp. 1-24. 
[28] J. Ko, C. Lu, M. Srivastava, J. Stankovic, A. Terzis and M. Welsh, 
“Wireless sensor networks for healthcare,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 
98, no. 11, pp. 1947-1960, 2010.  
[29] C. Karlof, N. Sastry and D. Wagner, “TinySec: A link layer security 
architecture for wireless sensor networks,” in SenSys '04, Baltimore, 
2004.  
[30] F. Ullah, M. Ahmad, M. Habib and J. Muhammad, “Analysis of security 
protocols for wireless sensor networks,” in Computer Research and 
Development (ICCRD), 2011 3rd International Conference on, 11-13 
March 2011.  
[31] T. Park and K. Shin, “LiSP: A lightweight security protocol for wireless 
sensor networks,” ACM Trans. embedded computing systems, vol. 3, no. 
3, Aug. 2004.  
[32] A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, J. Tygar, V. Wen and D. E. Culler, “SPINS: 
Security protocols for sensor networks,” ACM Journal of Wireless 
networks, vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 521-534, 2002.  
[33] M. Welsh, D. Malan, B. Duncan, T. Fulford-Jones and S. Moulton, 
“Wireless sensor networks for emergency medical care,” in GE Global 
research conference, Boston, 8 Mar. 2004.  
[34] P. Kumar, Y.-D. Lee and H. Lee, “Secure health monitoring using 
medical wireless sensor networks,” in Networked Computing and 
Advanced Information Management (NCM), 2010 Sixth International 
Conference on, 16-18 Aug. 2010.  
 
 
